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Abstract
We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus
making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than
two players. To remedy this, we introduce higher-order interactions, where a link can connect more than
two individuals, and study their evolutionary dynamics. We first consider a public goods game on a uniform
hypergraph, showing that it corresponds to the replicator dynamics in the well-mixed limit, and providing
an exact theoretical foundation to study cooperation in networked groups. We also extend the analysis
to heterogeneous hypergraphs that describe interactions of groups of different sizes and characterize the
evolution of cooperation in such cases. Finally, we apply our new formulation to study the nature of group
dynamics in real systems, showing how to extract the actual dependence of the synergy factor on the size of
a group from data on large communities of international collaborations. Our work is a first step towards the
implementation of new actions to boost cooperation in social groups.
∗Electronic address: unaialvarezr@gmail.com
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Cooperation in large groups of unrelated individuals distinguishes humans most from other
mammals, and it is one of the central pillars of our evolutionary success [1]. The impetus for this
remarkable other-regarding abilities can be attributed to the difficulties in rearing offspring that
survived, which the genus Homo experienced from the onset of its existence [2]. Nature’s pres-
sure towards alloparenting care is thus one of the earliest, if not the earliest, example of human
cooperation. And since such cooperation obviously requires communication and agreements, an
argument can also be made that it is precisely because of it that we have evolved to the highest
levels of intelligence in the animal world. In fact, an artificial neural network model was recently
proposed showing that selection for efficient decision-making in cooperative dilemmas can give
rise to selection pressures for greater cognitive abilities, and that intelligent strategies can them-
selves select for greater intelligence, thus providing mechanistic support for the social intelligence
hypothesis [3]. Nonetheless, cooperation remains at odds with the fundamental principles of Dar-
winian evolution, and it is fascinating that, as a species, we have succeeded in collectively holding
off self-interest over most of the last two million years.
Given this puzzle, the search for reasons and mechanisms that may allow cooperation to evolve
and proliferate is an evergreen and vibrant subject across the social and natural sciences [4–9].
Evolutionary game theory is long established as the theory of choice for addressing the puz-
zle mathematically [10–12], wherein social dilemmas constitute a particularly important class of
games. Namely, social dilemmas capture the essence of the problem since defection is the individ-
ually optimal strategy, whilst cooperation is the optimal strategy for the highest social welfare [13].
An important mechanism for cooperation in social dilemmas is network reciprocity [14], which
stands for the fact that a limited interaction range, as dictated by lattices or other types of networks,
facilitates the formation of compact clusters of cooperators that are in this way protected against
invading defectors. This basic mechanism could also be seen if the degree distribution of the inter-
action network is strongly heterogenous [15–17], if there is set or community structure [18, 19], or
if the evolution unfolds on two or more network layers that mutually support cooperative clusters
[20–27].
Despite the wealth of important insights concerning the evolution of cooperation on networks
and fundamental discoveries [28–30], an important unsolved problem remains accounting for co-
operation in groups, such as for example in the public goods game (PGG) [31, 32]. The simplest
remedy is to consider members of a group to be all the players that are pairwise-connected to
a central player [33, 34]. However, since the other players are further connected in a pairwise
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manner, one would also need to consider all the groups in which the central player is member
but is not central. Evidently, classical networks do not provide a unique procedure for defining a
group. Moreover, members of the same group are commonly not all directly connected with one
another, which prevents strategy changes among them, either in terms of imitation, replication, or
exploration. These facts posit a lack of common theoretical foundation for studying the evolution
of cooperation in networked groups. Without knowing who is connected to whom in a group,
it is also impossible to implement fundamental mechanisms that promote cooperation, such as
reciprocity [35, 36], image scoring [37–39], and reputation [40–42].
As a solution, we here introduce and study higher-order interactions in evolutionary games
that are played in groups. The distinctive feature of higher-order interactions is that, unlike in
classical networks [43], a link can connect more than just two individuals [44]. Thus, higher-
order networks naturally account for structured group interactions, wherein a group is simply
made up of all players that are connected by a so called hyperlink, which is the higher-order
analogous of the link. As a paradigmatic example, we consider a standard public goods game on
the higher-order analogous of a network, referred to as a hypergraph, see Figure 1. We first show
that it corresponds exactly to the replicator dynamics in the well-mixed limit. As such, it thus
provides an exact theoretical foundation to study cooperation in networked groups – effectively
a null model – that is amenable to further upgrades. Next, we consider the public goods game
on heterogenous hypergraphs, which allow us to consider scenarios in which the synergy factor
depends on the group size in a systematic and consistent manner. We show, for example, how
synergy factors that are given by different powers of the group size lead to a critical scaling in the
transition from defection to cooperation. Lastly, we also demonstrate how the proposed higher-
order interaction framework can be used to determine the synergy factor as a function of the group
size from experimental data, under the assumption that the structure of the hypergraph is the
outcome of an optimization process of the game it hosts. For that, we use the Internet Engineering
Task Force data (IETF), which is a large open international community of network designers,
operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution and the smooth operation of the
Internet.
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Evolutionary dynamics of higher-order interactions
The public goods game describes a setting where N players are requested to contribute to a
common pool with a token of value c [9]. Cooperators do contribute, and defectors do not. The
collected amount is then multiplied by the so called synergy factor R, and the benefit is shared
amongst all the members of the group. The payoff for the defectors and cooperators playing in
a group of g members is given by piD = RcwC/g and piC = RcwC/g − c respectively, with wC
representing the number of cooperators in the group. Typically c has a fixed value of c = 1, so that
the behavior of the system is determined by the synergy factor R, or the reduced synergy factor
r = R/g. Besides, it is common to represent the state of the system by the fraction of players
adopting each strategy, xC for the cooperators and xD for the defectors.
The evolutionary dynamics determines how the strategies of the players evolve with each iter-
ation of the PGG, that is, how the fractions xC and xD change with time. Here, we implement the
so-called fixed cost per game approach, where cooperators contribute with an entire token to each
game they play. Individual updates constitute micro-steps of the dynamics, whereas a (global)
time step corresponds to N individual steps, so that all the players in the system have the chance
to play the game and update their strategies. Players interact among them following the links of the
network they are embedded in. As mentioned before, the standard network implementation [33],
henceforth referred to as graph implementation (GI), is not able to account for the most general
interaction in groups [45–47] (see the Appendix for a detailed explanation).
In order to account for higher-order interactions, we use hypergraphs [44]. A hypergraph,
H(N ,L), is a mathematical object that consists of a set of N nodes N = {n1 = 1, .., nN = N}
and a set of L hyperlinks L = {l1, ..., lL}. Each hyperlink is a subset of two or more elements of
N and represents a group interaction. For instance, in Figure 1a, the hyperlink l1 contains nodes
n1 and n3, whereas the hyperlink l3 is the subset made up by nodes n4, n5 and n6. Furthermore, the
cardinality of a subset, known as the order of the hyperlink, is the number g of nodes in the group.
In the previous example, l1 has order 2 and l3 has order 3. In a hypergraph, the hyperdegree, ki, of
a node i represents the number of hyperlinks in which the node is involved into, thus, the number
of groups of a specific order g that contains i can be denoted by kgi . Hence, the hyperdegree of i
is given as ki =
∑g+
g=g− k
g
i , where g
− and g+ account for the minimal and maximal orders in L.
For example, in Figure 1a, k4 = 3 = k24 + k
3
4 , with k
2
4 = 1 (the hyperlink l4) and k
3
4 = 2 (the
hyperlinks l2 and l3).
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Although hypergraphs are not the only possible representation of group interactions, they allow
to exploit the analogy between the links representing pairwise interactions in contact networks
and hyperlinks, which are based on higher-order, group interactions. As we will show next, the
differences between these two approaches lead to fundamentally distinct outcomes of the PGG
evolutionary dynamics. To see how the evolutionary dynamics evolves in hypergraphs, let us
consider the first step of a standard graph implementation of the PGG. When a node ni and one
of its neighbors nj are selected on a graph, it is equivalent to say that a node and one of its
links are selected. Such a procedure can be easily generalized to group interactions of more than
g = 2 individuals, see Figure 1b. Note that if we choose more neighbors of ni to generate higher-
order interactions, such an extension would still be based on dyadic ones. Instead, we propose a
hypergraph implementation (HI) of the game that consists of selecting one of the hyperlinks of ni.
That is, in the HI setup, we select at random with uniform probability a node ni in the hypergraph
and one of its hyperlinks, li. Then, all the members of the hyperlink li play a game for each of
the hyperlinks they are part of, as illustrated in Figure 1. Finally, as it is customary, the nodes
accumulate the payoffs of all the rounds they play, and we normalize this quantity by the total
number of played games, such that each node’s performance is represented by its average payoff.
The second part of each micro-step of the evolutionary dynamics of the game involves updating
the strategy of node ni. To this end, we generalize the discrete replicator dynamics for the case
of higher-order interactions. We propose to compare the payoff pii of a node ni with the maximal
payoff of the selected hyperlink li. Under this rule, ni will adopt the strategy of the node with the
maximal payoff with probability 1
∆
∑
j∈li(pij − pii)
∏
k∈li θ(pij − pik), where ∆ accounts for the
maximal payoff difference. Note that the previous expression reduces to the standard one of the
GI when g = 2.
Results
To get some insights into the dynamics of the system in a simple configuration, we first studied
the PGG on uniform random hypergraphs (URH) with hyperlinks of order equal to g =2, 3, 4 and
5 (see Methods for details on how to generate URH). Numerical simulations have been carried out
for hypergraphs with N = 1000 nodes (players), and the game has been iterated for T = 104 time
steps. The results obtained are reported in Fig. 2. Panel (a) shows the final fraction of cooperators
as a function of the reduced synergy factor r. In each case, the simulations refer to hypergraphs
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FIG. 1: Higher-order vs pairwise interactions in a PGG. Comparison of the proposed
hypergraph implementation (HI) with a standard graph implementation (GI) of the game based
on pairwise interactions only. (a) In the HI implementation, a node, n2, and one of its hyperlinks,
l2, are randomly selected. All the nodes in the hyperlink l2, namely node n2, and the two nodes
highlighted in red n3 and n4, play all the games they are involved into, corresponding, in this
example, to PGG defined for the subset of nodes of the hyperlinks l1, l2, l3 and l4. Then, the
strategy of n2 is updated by comparing its payoff with that of the node with the highest
accumulated payoff of the hyperlink l2. This is not equivalent to play the PGG in the graph
generated by projecting the interactions of the hypergraph, which is shown in panel (b). In the
standard GI implementation, a neighbor of n2, let us say n3 −highlighted in red− is randomly
selected. The two nodes n2 and n3 then play all the games of the groups they are part of, that is,
of the groups made up by the subsets of nodes {n1, n3}, {n2, n3, n4}, {n1, n2, n3, n4} and
{n2, n3, n4, n5, n6, n7}. These subsets, colored as indicated in the figure, could be represented by
a different set of hyperlinks l¯1, l¯2, l¯3 and l¯4, respectively, which are different from the set of
hyperlinks of the original hypergraph. Finally, the strategy of n2 is updated by comparing its
accumulated payoff to that of node n3.
with L = Lc hyperlinks, where Lc accounts for the minimal number of hyperlinks that guarantees
the connectedness of the hypergraph. As it can be seen in the figure, there is a value of r beyond
which cooperation emerges. We define this critical value of the reduced synergy factor, rc, which
depends on g, as the lowest value of r for which the fraction of cooperators is nonzero.
The results show that rc decreases when the order g of the hyperlinks of the hypergraph in-
creases. This is equivalent to say that rc decreases when the same number of N = 1000 individ-
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FIG. 2: PGG with higher-order interactions in uniform random hypergraphs. Numerical
simulation of the HI of the game on uniform random hypergraphs of N = 1000 players and
different orders g. (a) Fraction of cooperators, xC , as a function of the synergy factor, r, for
hypergraphs with hyperdegree 〈k〉 = kc, or total number of links L = Lc, where kc and Lc stand
for the critical degree or number of links guaranteeing a connected hypergraph. (b) Critical value
of the synergy factor, rc, as a function of the ratio between the number of hyperlinks L and the
critical value Lc in hypergraphs of different density. (c) Relaxation times as a function of the
synergy factor, r, for hypergraphs with hyperdegree < k >= 5kc. In all plots, triangles
correspond to numerical simulations, while the solid lines are the results of our theoretical
predictions.
uals play in larger groups. We believe that this observation is important, since determining how r
varies with the size of the group, allows to get more realistic insights. Admittedly, the well-mixed
limit of population-size groups is rarely applicable in reality, thus, the study of the impact of hav-
ing large groups inside large populations, as allowed by our higher-order framework, is key. The
panel (b) of Fig. 2 displays how the value of rc depends on the number of hyperlinks L in the
hypergraphs. For each value of g, we observe an increase of rc with L, and a tendency, for large
hypergraph densities, to the value rc = 1, which corresponds to the well-mixed replicator approx-
imation [48]. Finally, the value of r also influences how long it takes for the system to converge
to the stationary solution. This is illustrated in panel (c), where we show results of the relaxation
time from an initial configuration with xD = xC = 0.5, in a hypergraph with L = 5Lc. These
results are obtained by running the simulations up to a maximum of 104 steps. Furthermore, for
the replicator approximation, the value of T can be analytically computed as T = ln(N−1)|Q| , with
Q = (1 − r)/∆ (see the Appendix for the details of the calculation). As it can be seen in the
figure, the agreement between the theoretical predictions and the numerical results is qualitatively
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and quantitatively very good. This indicates that the dynamics of the PGG on uniform random
hypergraphs corresponds to the replicator dynamics in the well-mixed limit.
The proposed HI of the PGG allows to study the more general, realistic and interesting case of
hypergraphs where not all the hyperlinks have the same order. Important examples of such systems
include teams of different sizes working for a common goal or one-to-many communication via
apps like WhatsApp, where users can create and belong to several groups of different sizes. In
what follows, we consider heterogenous random hypergraphs with an assigned distribution of
hyperlinks. Such hypergraphs are characterized by their total number of hyperlinks L and by a
probability vector p = {pg}g+g=g− , whose entry pg = kg/k specifies how likely it is, on average,
that the hyperdegree k of the node contains kg groups of order g. p is normalized such that∑g+
g=g− p
g = 1. Considering groups of different orders in the same hypergraph allows to focus on
another important aspect of the PGG on higher-order structures, namely, the possible dependence
of the rescaled synergy factor r on the order of the group. This is important for practical purposes,
given the increasing interest in understanding how the size of a group impacts its performance.
As it has been shown recently [49], large and small teams play different roles in science and
technology ecosystems, thus, it is natural to assume that the synergy factor of a group depends on
its size. This is particularly true in scientific publications, where it has been shown that the larger
the group, the more citations a produced publication is likely to attract [50, 51]. Therefore, as a
general form for such a dependence we assume that the synergy factor R is an increasing power
law function of g, namely:
R(g) = αgβ (1)
with parameter α > 0 and exponent β ≥ 0. The value of the exponent allows to tune the benefit
that the players are able to produce when working as a group. In particular, adopting a superlinear
scaling β > 1, means considering a synergistic effect of a group that goes beyond the sum of the
individual contributions [52, 53]. Furthermore, the assumed dependence in Eq. (1) completely
neglects saturation effects or even possible disadvantages due to difficulties in coordinating large
groups. Under this assumption, the average payoff difference between cooperation and defection
can be written as:
piD − piC =
g+∑
g=g−
pg(1− αgβ−1) (2)
where g− and g+ are again the minimal and maximal orders of hyperlinks, respectively. The
relaxation time is again given by T = ln(N − 1)/|Q|, whereQ = (piD−piC)/∆ (see the Appendix
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for the definition of ∆ in the general case and for explicit calculations). It is then possible to derive
the critical value of the parameter α as a function of the exponent β as:
αc(β) =
1∑g+
g=g− p
ggβ−1
=
1
Kβ , (3)
where, for simplicity, we have defined Kβ ≡
∑g+
g=g− p
ggβ−1.
To explore how the dynamics evolves in heterogeneous random hypergraphs, we have per-
formed numerical simulations of the PGG considering four different values of g = 2, 3, 4 and 5
and allowing the values of pg to take only multiples of 1/4. This leads to 35 possible hypergraphs,
one for each of all conceivable convex sums of {p2, p3, p4, p5} with the previous constraints. Re-
sults are reported in Fig. 3 for four different values of the power exponent β, namely, β = 0, 1, 2, 3,
shown with different colors. Notice that the case β = 1 corresponds to the underlying linear as-
sumption of the standard PGG: in this case α plays the role of the reduced synergy factor r. Panels
a) through d) plot the color-coded fraction of cooperators as a function of the parameter α in the
definition of the synergy factor. The hypergraphs Hi have 〈k〉 = 2kc and are displayed according
to their value of Kβ , i.e., the value of the critical point αc(β). As for the case of uniform random
hypergraphs, we find that although the critical point is slightly over estimated for low densities by
the analytical approximation, there is still a good agreement between the theoretical predictions
of the well-mixed replicator approximation and the numerical simulations. We next explore the
behavior of the relaxation time. Panels e) through h) shows results obtained for heterogenous hy-
pergraphs with 〈k〉 = 5kc. As it was done for the homogeneous scenario, we follow the dynamics
of the system up to a maximum of T = 104 time steps. The plots show that the relaxation times
depend on α for all values of β 6= 1, albeit rather differently with respect to the dependence of
the critical value αc for β < 1 and β > 1. In order to further explore this relationship, we ana-
lyzed how the average relaxation time varies as a function of the critical point αc. Results shown
in panels i) to l) reveal that the dependence is always linear. However, when the synergy factor
increases super linearly, there appear different curves, each one corresponding to a distinct family
of hypergraphs and characterized by a different linear relation between the average relaxation time
and the critical value. This behavior introduces an additional degree of freedom that can turn very
useful, since the degeneracy that is observed for β ≤ 1 is broken for β > 1, and therefore one can
independently set a critical point and a relaxation time by opportunely choosing the corresponding
hypergraph.
From the previous results, a natural question arises: is it possible to determine the value of the
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synergy factor for a real PGG for each of the possible group sizes? A plausible answer to this
question can be obtained under the assumption that the very same structure of the hypergraph is
the result of an evolutionary process in which nodes select the groups they belong to. We hy-
pothesize that each individual tries to optimize the ideal number of groups of each order, based
on the perceived dependence of the synergy factor on the group size. In this way, each real-world
hypergraph would be the optimal structure that supports the game it hosts. We could then extract
the functional form R(g) directly from the hyperdegree distribution of the hypergraph. More pre-
cisely, the goal would be to use the information in the vector p of the hypergraphs on which the
PGG occurs to determine the functional form, R(g), of the synergy factor by imposing two con-
ditions. The first condition comes from the assumption that the unknown reduced synergy factor
r(g) is proportional to pg. This originates in the intuition that the distribution of the hyperdegree
of a generic player should be aligned with the potential benefit that each player expects to obtain
for each higher-order interaction. The second condition imposes that the average payoff of coop-
erators is equal to the average payoff of defectors. This implies that the system is at equilibrium
and guarantees the coexistence of cooperators and defectors. Thus, given that these two conditions
are satisfied, it is possible to extract the curves of r(g) and R(g) for each higher-order structure in
real datasets.
In order to show that the aforementioned procedure applies to real scenarios, we use the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) dataset. The dataset contains the information about the number of
authors in each publication written by the IETF members. Fig. 4 reports the profile of the synergy
factors R(g) and r(g) obtained for this dataset. For both the total and the reduced synergy factors,
we immediately notice the existence of a maximum value of R and r, respectively. This indicates
that there is an optimal tradeoff between the positive and negative effects of increasing the group
size. In the case of r, the maximum is located at g = 2, and accounts for the group size with the
maximal individual payoff. For R, the maximum is located at g = 5, and represents the group size
with the largest total synergy factor.
It is possible to extract more information from the observed features of this dataset by fac-
torizing the synergy factor as the product of two (opposite) functions of g and then perform a
numerical fit, see Methods. This enables us to interpret the synergy factor as a combination of two
contrary effects of the higher-order interactions for this particular dataset. The results provide a
game-theoretic interpretation of the IETF publication dataset. Specifically, in the context of this
bibliographic dataset, hidden benefits and costs that conform the synergy factor can be associated
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to several aspects of the task of producing a publication. Benefits (increase of the synergy factor
with increasing g) would correspond to the potential reinforcement of the amount and quality of
the ideas and the potential increase in the outreach of the work with the number of co-authors
involved. On the contrary, the costs (decrease with increasing g) would be the additional organi-
zational effort in the process of arriving to a consensus and carrying out the tasks for publishing
a paper. These ideas are aligned with recent studies about the creation and production of research
ideas [54] and the role, group dynamics and success of teams [49–51]. Our formalism allows for a
quantitative analysis of these phenomena and could be used in future applications to design ways
to foster higher-order cooperation.
Discussion
Summing up, we have introduced higher-order interactions in evolutionary games to study
cooperation in groups. Since higher-order interactions allow for a single link to connect more than
just two individuals, they are naturally suitable to define groups in networks. In doing so, higher-
order interactions thus do away with the arbitrary definitions of groups in classical networks, and
they provide an exact theoretical foundation to study cooperation in networked groups. We have
shown that the public goods game on a hypergraph is effectively a null model that agrees exactly
with the replicator dynamics in the well-mixed limit. As such, it can be used in future research
towards upgrades that add additional layers of reality in models of human cooperation, either by
means of strategic complexity [9], or by means of more complex interaction networks [55].
Towards the latter effect, we have also studied the public goods game on heterogeneous hy-
pergraphs, where hyperlinks can have different lengths. Due to the exact definition of a group in
the proposed framework, we have been able to systematically and consistently consider synergy
factors that are dependent on group size. Indeed, the framework allows us to understand group
size effects on cooperation in its most general form. As an example, we have considered synergy
factors that are given by different powers of the group size, showing a critical scaling in the tran-
sition from defection to cooperation. In this case too, we have observed a significant agreement
between the simulations and the analytical predictions of the model. Our framework enables novel
analyses of real systems, as we have shown for the IETF publications dataset, providing new in-
sights regarding the positive and negative effects associated to higher-order interactions and the
nature of group dynamics.
12
It is also worth mentioning that in his essay titled Innate Social Aptitudes of Man, W. D. Hamil-
ton wrote, “There may be reasons to be glad that human life is a many-person game and not just
a disjoined collection of two-person games”. He was referring to the fact that social enforcement
works better in groups with more than two members, which can offer at least a partial cure for the
problems with reciprocation in larger groups. Indeed, humans have a special gift for reciprocation,
but even defining it in large groups is a non-trivial task [36]. If the group contains a cooperator
and a defector, and in the absence of information who is who, whom do you reciprocate with? We
note that the theoretical framework of higher-order interactions resolves this long-standing chal-
lenge in evolutionary game theory, and in the future invites reexamining fundamental mechanisms
that may promote cooperation, such as image scoring [37–39], rewarding [56], and punishment
[57–60].
Given the fundamental differences between pairwise and higher-order interactions, it would
also be of interest to revisit the role of specific network properties and their role in the evolution of
cooperation. In this regard, the role of strongly heterogenous degree distributions [15–17], com-
munity structure [19], as well as two or more network layers [20–27], promise to be fruitful ground
for future explorations on how interaction structure impacts cooperation. Overall, we believe that
the introduction of higher-order interactions to evolutionary games has a strong transformative
potential for better understanding the evolution of cooperation and other social processes in net-
works, and we hope that our research will prove to be an important first step in this exciting and
promising direction.
Methods
Uniform random hypergraphs (URH): As a prerequisite for working out the numerical sim-
ulations we explain here the procedure for creating hypergraphs where all the hyperlinks have
the same order, which are known as uniform hypergraphs. An URH of order g is constructed by
assigning a uniform probability p to each g-tuple of N . For each of them, a random number in
the [0, 1) interval is generated, and if this number is lower than p, the hyperlink containing the
g-tuple is created. However, this method scales badly with g given the large amount of g-tuples
to be considered. A more efficient variant is to have a predefined value of hyperlinks L, and gen-
erate a random integer in the [1, CNg ] interval. One has to provide an ordering for the set of all
possible hyperlinks, so that each of the random integers corresponds to a position in this ordering.
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The hyperlinks that are reached through this process are created. For the purpose of studying the
stationary condition of a game, we are interested in having a connected hypergraph. The critical
thresholds for hyperlinks Lc and hyperdegree kc are given by Lc = N lnN/g and kc = lnN .
When p is tuned to exceed these numbers there is a high probability that the resultant hypergraph
is connected.
Induced synergy factor from higher-order structures: We explain the procedure for deriving
the synergy factor of real games given the information of the hypergraph. Let us take a closer look
at the assumptions allowing for this procedure. The first one, which is only needed if one does not
have direct access to the degree distribution, is to derive the degree distribution by assuming that
the dataset can be modelled as a heterogeneous random hypergraph. In this case, we transform
the distribution in the total number of articles to the distribution in the number of articles a given
node is part of, by assuming kg = gLg/N . The second one, the critical point condition, piD = piC
seems a natural requirement for a stationary system once we neglect the trivial xD = 1 and xC = 1
solutions. In the simulations we test different expressions, and numerically find those parameters
that minimize the distance with eitherR(g) or r(g). The best results that we have obtained, labelled
as ei in Fig. 4, are given by
e1 : r(g) = γ0g
γ1e−γ2(g−1) e2 : R(g) = γ0gγ1e−γ2(g−1)
e3 : r(g) = γ0g
γ1e−γ2(g−1)
γ3 e4 : R(g) = γ0g
γ1e−γ2(g−1)
γ3
Notice that here the (e1,e2) and (e3,e4) pairs of equations have the same structure, but their
parameters have been obtained by minimizing the distance with r(g) and R(g), respectively. The
γ0 parameter is obtained analytically by applying the critical point condition.
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FIG. 3: PGG with higher-order interactions in heterogeneous random hypergraphs. We
assume that the synergy factor grows according to Eq. (1) and consider the set of hypergraphsHi
that contain hyperlinks of orders g = {2, 3, 4, 5} with probabilities pg taking values in the set
{0, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1} −there are 35 possible such hypergraphs. (a-d) Fraction of cooperators as a
function of α for each of the 35 hypergraphsHi and several values of β. The hypergraphs are
ordered according to their value of Kβ . Simulations have been carried out up to T = 104 time
steps for hypergraphs with 〈k〉 = 2kc, and triangles correspond to the theoretical predictions in
the replicator approximation (see the appendix for details). (e-h) Relaxation time as a function of
α for the set of hypergraphsHi. Now hypergraphs have 〈k〉 = 5kc. (i-l) Predictions for the
critical value αc as a function of the average relaxation time, calculated for each hypergraph inHi
by averaging over the intervals of α [0,8], [0,2], [0,1] and [0,0.5] for β = 0, 1, 2, 3 respectively.
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FIG. 4: Induced synergy factor from higher-order structures. We extract the synergy factor as
a function of the group size for a bibliographic dataset of the IETF that contains the number of
publications as a function of the number of authors g. We first infer the distribution in the
hyperdegrees from the original dataset by assuming that the hypergraph is random. We then
impose the critical point condition and extract the value of the synergy factor under the
hypothesis that r(g) is proportional to p. Finally, the synergy factors r(g) in (a) and R(g) in (b)
are factorized in two analytical expressions that are respectively an increasing and a decreasing
function of g. These functions represent the positive and negative effects of the groups and are
assumed to be encoded in the synergy factor. The positive contribution scales superlinearly with
the number of players and the negative one decreases exponentially. See Methods for the explicit
form of the expressions for ei.
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Appendix
A. Graph Implementation
In the original network implementation, or GI, the core idea is to derive the higher order struc-
ture from the network of players. In the GI every node constructs its own focal hyperlink, whose
constituents are the node itself and its first neighbours. Therefore, for a system of N players the
GI imposes N different groups, each of them of g = k2i + 1 members. A micro-step in the game
is played by following a sequence of steps: Firstly a node, and one of its neighbours, say ni and
nj , are randomly selected fromN . Secondly the nodes play a round of the game for all the groups
they belong to, accumulate their payoffs, pii and pij , and normalize them with the number of games
they have played. As there is a group for each player every node will play k2i +1 rounds. The third
step is the update of the strategy, and for that purpose we employ the replicator update rule. Ac-
cording to this, ni will adopt the strategy of nj with probability 1∆(pij − pii)θ(pij − pii), where ∆ is
the absolute value of the maximal payoff difference for all the possible strategies. It is noteworthy
to mention that the replicator update rule is not the only update mechanism, but it is the one that
we have selected because it provides an effective and noisy payoff oriented update rule by means
of a simple analytic expression.
B. Replicator Dynamics for URH
Let us introduce now the replicator model for predicting the dynamics of the system. This tech-
nique is based on the indistinguishability between different nodes, and therefore it should describe
the system as long as the hypergraph is connected and the hyperlinks are uniformly distributed
among the nodes. We are working with URH, and therefore the more connected the system is, the
better it fulfils the uniform requirement, and the closer it gets to the replicator description.
In this simplified analysis we will describe the system in terms the fraction of defectors xD
and the fraction of cooperators xC . We compute the average normalized payoff of defectors and
cooperators piD and piC , as a function of their fractions, xD and xC , in an hyperlink of order g. In
order to do so, we sum the payoff of all the possible configurations of g − 1 nodes. The sum is
taken over g−1 because one of the nodes is already occupied by a defector, in piD, or a cooperator
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in piC . The payoff is calculated with the reduced synergy factor r.
piD =
g−1∑
i=0
 g − 1
i
xg−1−iD xiCir
piC =
g−1∑
i=0
 g − 1
i
xg−1−iD xiC((i+ 1)r − 1) (4)
The total average payoffs, are obtained by multiplying the ones of Eq. (4) with the average degree.
But, we also normalize the total payoff with the degree, so the terms that go into the dynamical
equation are indeed piD and piC . One can observe that the piD−piC function is invariant with respect
to the order g.
piD − piC =
g−1∑
i=0
 g − 1
i
xg−1−iD xiC [ir − ((i+ 1)r − 1)] = (1− r) g−1∑
i=0
 g − 1
i
xg−1−iD xiC
= (1− r)(xD + xC)g−1 = 1− r (5)
We now compute ∆, the maximal payoff difference to be used in the replicators update rule.
The pi+ and pi− indicate the maximal and minimal payoff values from all the possible configuration
of strategies.
∆ ≡
 pi+D − pi−C if pi+D − pi−C > pi+C − pi−Dpi+C − pi−D if pi+D − pi−C < pi+C − pi−D (6)
∆ is only expressed for comparisons of payoffs of different strategies, since the strategies are
copied from the neighbours, and therefore the terms pi+i − pi−i , where two nodes share the same
strategy, are irrelevant. For any order g, ∆ is given by
∆ =
 r(g − 2) + 1 if r < 1gr − 1 if r > 1 (7)
We now work with Q, the normalized payoff difference, Q ≡ (piD − piC)/∆.
The system equation is derived as the sum of all the channels via which the strategy of a node
can change. These channels correspond to the different configurations of strategies of hyperlinks
of order g, weighted with the probabilities of the nodes having a particular strategy. For each con-
figuration, one has to compute the probability of having a defector-cooperator pair,wDwC/g(g−1)
and the probability that this pair results in an strategy change. Notice that the values ofwD andwC ,
the number of defectors and cooperators in the group, are precisely the exponents of xC and xD.
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We employ the replicator update, which in this context means that the flip probability is computed
as −Qθ(piC − piD) when a defector changes into a cooperator and as Qθ(piD − piC) in the opposite
case. This sign corresponds to the calculation of the fraction of defectors, the contrary holds true
for the fraction of cooperators.
∂txD =
G−2∑
i=0
 g
1 + i
xg−1−iD x1+iC (g − 1− i)(1 + i)g(g − 1) [− (−Qθ(piC − piD))+Qθ(piD − piC)]
=
G−2∑
i=0
 g
1 + i
xg−1−iD x1+iC Q(g − 1− i)(1 + i)g(g − 1)
=
G−2∑
i=0
Qxg−1−iD x
1+i
C
g!(g − 1− i)(1 + i)
(g − 1− i)!(1 + i)!g(g − 1) (8)
=
G−2∑
i=0
Qxg−1−iD x
1+i
C
(g − 2)!
(g − 2− i)!i!
= Qx0x1
G−2∑
i=0
 g − 2
i
xg−2−iD xiC = QxDxC(xD + xC)g−2 = QxDxC (9)
This is precisely the replicator equation which provides a very useful tool for describing the
system since its structure does not explicitly depend on g, even if the evolution itself does, since
Q is a function of g.
∂txD = QxDxC
∂txC = −QxDxC (10)
The stationary condition yields three possible outcomes, xD = 0, xC = 0 and Q = 0. The
first two are the trivial phases of the system, and the third one denotes the critical point, that
corresponds to r = 1. Notice that this condition is reduced to finding the zeros of Eq. (5), and is
therefore common for all systems, and independent of their order. This implies that for random
uniform hypergraphs cooperators only emerge when R > g.
If the initial condition is given by a uniform distribution of strategies, xD = xC = 0.5, the time
evolution reads
xD(t) =
1
1 + eQt
xC(t) =
1
1 + e−Qt
(11)
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Even if the relaxation time is infinite, we can get the time to arrive the neighbourhood of the
asymptotic state by imposing the condition xi = 1/N or xi = (N − 1)/N that yield
T =
ln(N − 1)
|Q| (12)
C. Replicator Dynamics for HRH
The first thing to notice is that the average payoff difference, is nothing but the sum of the
average payoff differences for each of the orders, weighted with the pg. The sum goes from g−,
the minimal value of g to g+, the maximal one.
piD − piC =
g+∑
g=g−
pg(1− rg) (13)
We first derive the normalization factor ∆, from Eq. (7), via the explicit expression for the
reduced synergy factor rg = αgβ−1. We consider α, β ≥ 0. The extreme point of rg at β = 1
divides the analysis in two different intervals, β < 1 and β ≥ 1.
In the first one, β < 1, the maximal payoffs pi+ are obtained for the lowest order g−, and the
minimal payoffs pi− for the highest order g+.
pi+D = αg
β−1
− (g− − 1), pi−D = 0, pi+C = αgβ− − 1, pi−C = αgβ−1+ − 1 (14)
Therefore, we get
∆(β < 1) =
 αg
β−1
− (g− − 1)− αgβ−1+ + 1 if α ≤ 2gβ−1− +gβ−1+
αgβ− − 1 if α > 2gβ−1− +gβ−1+
(15)
In the second interval, β ≥ 1, the maximal payoffs are obtained for the maximal orders, and
the minimal payoffs for the minimal orders.
pi+D = αg
β−1
+ (g+ − 1), pi−D = 0, pi+C = αgβ+ − 1, pi−C = αgβ−1− − 1 (16)
which yields,
∆(β ≥ 1) =
 αg
β−1
+ (g+ − 1)− αgβ−1− + 1 if α ≤ 2gβ−1− +gβ−1+
αgβ+ − 1 if α > 2gβ−1− +gβ−1+
(17)
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With piD−piC and ∆, we can obtainQ, as in the uniform case. And in terms ofQ the differential
equation for the time evolution is exactly Eq. (10). Therefore, the relaxation time is again given
by Eq. (12), and the critical point is again obtained by making piD − piC = 0, which yields
αc =
1∑g+
g=g− p
ggβ−1
(18)
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